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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the economics of secession is still in its infancy (Spolaore, 2010; Bordignon, 
2010) as a specific field of economics science, some very interesting contributions 
have been made in the last fifteen years about this issue. The general discussion 
focuses essentially in the trade off between the benefits of size versus the costs of 
heterogeneity. The precise equilibrium point of this trade-off depends on two factors: 
the international openness of the economy and the quality of democracy and of 
institutions (Alesina, 2003, Alesina and Spolaore, 1997 and 2003; Alesina e.a., 2005; 
Spolaore, 2010).  
 
In a world of protectionism, where political borders suppose barriers to international 
trade, the size of the country is very important because it determines the size of the 
domestic market. However, as the empirical evidence generally confirms, the more 
there is a world of free trade and high economic integration, the more small countries 
can prosper. As Spolaore (2010) concludes: “In a nutshell, economic integration and 
political disintegration tend to go hand in hand”. 
 
The quality of political institutions and democracy is the other factor with a relevant 
influence in this trade off. The costs are not directly imposed by a large territorial 
heterogeneity in preferences, but by its translation into the field of political action. On 
the contrary, they are produced by homogeneous public policies provided with uniform 
rules from central governments.   
 
Federalism and decentralisation can increase country stability and reduce the 
incentives to secede, but this depends on two essential factors: the degree of 
decentralisation and the quality of institutions. Decentralisation will reduce 
secessionism “if and only if decentralisation is above a given threshold” (Spolaore, 
2010). The quality of decentralisation depends also strongly on the real political 
decision-making power allocated to intermediate (state, provincial, regional) 
governments; on their ability to effectively represent heterogeneous preferences; and 
on an institutional framework which could ensure the resolution of conflicts through 
negotiation and agreement.  
 
The design of an institutional framework which is flexible enough to accommodate a 
heterogeneous society becomes, therefore, a crucial element. For example, according 
to Becker (2012) this was an essential factor for reducing the strength of the 
independence movement in Canada. An essential function of the institutional 
framework is to create a feeling of political community membership, without which it is 
very difficult to achieve country stability. Mentioning Bakke and Wibbels (2006), 
Bordignon (2010) outlines that “autonomy and redistribution within a country may help; 
but if there is no (…) feeling of belonging across the different peoples living in a 
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country, it is difficult for them to be enough”. The economic arguments for 
secessionism are therefore very important, but the decisive ones might be of a fully 
political nature. 
 
In some large European countries, in the last decades economic globalisation has 
gone hand in hand with a powerful trend to political decentralisation (this has been the 
case in: United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain). In Spain, and after years of apparent 
stability, the relations between Catalonia and Spain are experiencing troubled times. 
Different scenarios are foreseeable, and the possibility of constitutional changes is not 
excluded. On the contrary, such changes are highly probable in some scenarios. This 
paper tries to make a contribution on this issue by examining particularly the main 
economic effects of both the staying together and the secession scenarios. Following 
this introduction, the second section reviews the main aspects of the relations between 
Catalonia and Spain. The third and fourth sections analyse different scenarios with a 
particular focus on the main issues that the secession scenario raises. The fifth section 
contains a concluding remark.   
 
II. THE RELATION CATALONIA/SPAIN: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ASPECTS 
 
Some relevant figures 
 
Table 1 supplies some relevant data about the relative size and role of the Catalan 
economy within Spain. Catalonia has a population slightly above 7.5 million inhabitants, 
or 16.0% of the total Spanish population. The GDP was, in 2012, close to 200 billion 
Euros, or 18.9% of total Spanish GDP.  
 
The GDP per capita of Catalonia (26.319.5 Euros) is around 20% higher than the 
Spanish average. It is 116.9 of EU average (in purchasing power parity) and 106.7, 
considering the EU-15 (before the enlargement to the Eastern countries). For Spain, 
the respective figures are 97.7 and 89.0.  
 
The productive structure of Catalonia shows also some particularities. The Catalan 
economy is both more industry-focused and more open than the rest of Spain. Even if 
the economic crisis has produced devastating effects in industrial employment, industry 
contribution to total GDP is almost 4 points higher in Catalonia than in Spain (19.2% vs. 
15.5%).  
 
The Catalan economy is also, by far, a significantly more open economy than the 
Spanish one. Catalan exports of goods (services excluded) represent 26.2% of total 
Spanish exports. Exports of goods represent almost thirty per cent (29.4%) of Catalan 
GDP, while they represent 19.3% of the rest of Spain (excluding Catalonia). Also in the 
tourism sector (by far, the most important service in exports), Catalonia leads the 
Spanish economy. It receives around 25% of all foreign tourists visiting Spain. In turn, 
Spain is amongst the top three countries in the world in this economic activity.  
 
Even if the fundamentals show potential for successful reforms and, thus, for growth 
and employment, the current situation is still very worrying. The Spanish and Catalan 
economy are in the midst of a very profound crisis and have been in recession for 
many quarters. The rate of unemployment is extremely high (22,3% for Catalonia and  
26,0% for Spain,). The imbalances that are at the root of the crisis in Catalonia are very 
similar to the Spanish ones: extreme over-indebtedness in the private sector, a housing 
bubble, troubles in the financial system, significant current account deficit, and a fall in 
competitiveness which is in turn mainly due to a sharp increase in unit labour costs 
prior to the crisis.  
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Some of these imbalances have been very drastically and positively corrected in the 
last years, in particular the current account deficit and the recovery of competitiveness. 
But in some other areas we are still just in the middle of the road, and, very especially 
concerning unemployment, the task ahead is still very hard.    
 
The democratic Constitution of 1978:  Some historical and political background 
and the creation of the ‘State of the Autonomies’ 
 
The historic problem of integration of Catalonia within the Spanish state exists, at least, 
since the eighteenth century, after the Succession War, a conflict in which many 
European countries were involved. One of the main reasons for the difficulties in 
integrating Catalonia within Spain is the historical asymmetry between political power 
and economic power in Spain. The centre (Castille) has historically had political and 
military power, while the periphery (Catalonia and Basque Country) have had the 
economic power.  
 
In contrast with what happened in other countries, in Spain, nation state and national 
market did not go hand to hand. Economic weakness didn’t allow the centre to perform 
the process of ‘national’ assimilation of former ‘peripheral’ nations and cultures that 
took place in other countries and the creation of a national market as a powerful and 
effective nation–maker. In Spain, the so called ‘peripheral nations’ survived. It could be 
said that n some way Spain has always been a frustrated nation state.  
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, as Catalonia emerged as a powerful 
industrial region leading the Spanish economy, a political movement of national 
affirmation arose with special strength: ‘Catalanism’. ‘Catalanism’ had two basic goals: 
to achieve the self-government and the acknowledgement of Catalonia as a nation; and 
to transform and modernise the Spanish state, making it able to provide the needs an 
industrial society required.  
 
‘Catalanism’ has been a transversal, large movement that for most than a century and 
a half has occupied the mainstream of Catalan politics (both at the right and at the left 
of the political spectrum). In the short periods of autonomy and democracy before the 
1936-1939 Civil War (in the 1910’s and in the 1930’s during the Second Republic), and 
since 1977, with the establishment of a democratic monarchy after the death of Franco, 
‘Catalanist’ parties have won all the elections held in Catalonia.  
 
After the Franco’s dictatorship, the democratic Constitution of 1978 seemed to put an 
end to the historic problem of integration of peripheral nations (especially Catalonia and 
the Basque Country) in Spain. The main Catalan parties played an essential role in its 
elaboration. In a sense, the Constitution contained an implicit agreement: mainstream 
‘Catalanists’ parties renounced to their ultimate aspirations for secessionism, and the 
main democratic Spanish forces to the ‘renaissance’ of the traditional Spanish state: 
unitary, strongly centralised and deeply impregnated of Spanish nationalism. 
 
The Constitution of 1978 established what has been called ‘the State of Autonomies’, 
with the creation of the Autonomous Communities, an intermediate level of government 
with a legislative assembly. In that moment the acceptance of self-government was 
seen as a historical step.  
 
To obtain an agreement on the nature of peripheral countries, the Constitution 
introduced what was then considered a very important distinction between nationalities 
and regions. The Constitution distinguished, too, between two types of Autonomous 
Communities, regarding the range and level of responsibilities they could assume, and 
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also the speed in becoming one. As a matter of fact, when the Constitution was 
approved in 1978 it was not expected that the most common model for all regions 
would be to become Autonomous Communities, but rather a framework with a quite 
specific and differentiated treatment in the historic regions of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country (and, to a lesser extent, Galicia).  
 
However, in practice the autonomy was spread to all Spanish regions in similar terms, 
with the very important exception of the specific financial regimes applied to the 
Basque Country and Navarra. The generalisation of autonomy did in fact lead to a 
watering down of the quality and intensity of responsibilities and resources at the 
Autonomous Community level of Government. In fact in Catalonia the degree of self-
government that was obtained did not meet previous expectations.  
 
The Constitution granted nonetheless stability for a period of about twenty years (1980-
2000). Catalonia has at present an autonomous government with a huge budget, a 
Parliament, and direct responsibilities in the delivery of basic public services. However, 
financial and economic problems were always present in some crucial areas: the 
delimitation of responsibilities, the financing system of the autonomy and the allocation 
of central government expenditures (notably, infrastructures) in Catalonia. 
 
The ‘Statute of Autonomy’ of Catalonia (the by-Constitution that sets up the rules and 
institutions of the self-government of Catalonia) was enacted in 1979, and the first 
Catalan elections took place in 1980. Since then, a large process of devolution of 
responsibilities from the central government to the autonomous governments occurred. 
The Autonomous Communities represented in 2010 the 34.6% of the total expenditure 
of the public sector (Table 2), a very significant figure, higher than in many federal 
countries. 
 
In quantitative terms, the key responsibilities of autonomous governments are health 
and education. Table 3 shows the distribution of expenditure for the government of 
Catalonia. In 2012 it reached 37.5 billion euros, (around 18.75% of GDP). Health 
represented 23.8% of all public expenditure and education 14.8%. The government of 
Catalonia is fully responsible for the provision of these essential public services, 
although key regulations on standard of service are decided by central government. In 
2012, the effects of the recession and the public deficits resulted in the expenditure 
related to the debt burden soaring to the 14.8% of the total. This figure includes all kind 
of financial debt, mostly bonds issued by the Catalan government in its own name. This 
debt does not have the backing of central government, although the latter must 
authorise any new issuance of autonomic debt, in line with its ‘Annual Borrowing Plan’. 
In general, the responsibilities are very similar across Autonomous Communities, 
although Catalonia has a special status in some particular fields, such as Police and 
Justice which jointly represent 5.4% of total expenditure. 
 
In general, in different public policy areas there is not an exclusive allocation of 
responsibilities to one single level of government, but rather different governments 
share concurrently some degree of responsibilities with different vertical powers. For 
example, it is very usual that the central government has the power to pass a basic 
law, and autonomous governments to pass second level laws and exercise executive 
powers. Therefore, a relatively high budget doesn’t necessarily mean an equally high 
political power in decision making in any functional field of responsibility.  
 
In a way, in many fields, the Autonomous Communities have low quality 
responsibilities, of a rather more administrative than political nature. This is mostly the 
result of an ambiguous and insufficient constitutional design, but also of the 
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interpretation made by the Constitutional Court about the room and power that the 
Constitution allows to Autonomous Communities.  
 
Financing Autonomous Communities 
 
The essential traits of the finances of autonomous communities have evolved 
considerably throughout the years. In the early days their revenues were essentially 
grants from the central government, by an amount equivalent to the expenditure 
transferred (and whose value was calculated through a rather complex and 
administrative procedure). Over time the system was slowly improved in different 
aspects. At present every five years a negotiation takes place between central 
government and all Autonomous Communities and as a result some changes are 
introduced into the system.  
 
Table 4 shows the current distribution of resources for the government of Catalonia (for 
a detailed analysis and description, see Vilalta, 2013). After the last reform, in 2009, 
73% of total revenue comes from taxes, 8% from grants, and around 18% are other 
revenue. Three big categories of taxes can be established. Firstly, own taxes, which 
are not very relevant in overall revenue terms as they represent 1.6%. The second 
group are totally ceded taxes (created for the central government, which establishes 
their basic elements), and represent around 15% of total taxes. The Autonomous 
Communities have some normative responsibility (which can be very large, especially 
when deciding the tax rate), receive all the yields coming from these taxes and also 
have administrative responsibility to collect them.  
 
The third group are shared taxes, which represent around 82.7% of total taxes and 
61% of total revenue. The revenues produced by the main taxes of the fiscal system, 
excluding corporate tax, are shared between central government and autonomous 
governments: personal income tax (50%-50%), value added tax (50%-50%) and 
excises (58%-42%), for Autonomous Communities and central government, 
respectively. 
 
Grants from the central government represent less than 10% of total revenue of the 
government of Catalonia. Their structure is complex and the result of a history of 
permanent changes that led to the current situation where three main funds exist. 
 
The so-called ‘Fundamental Public Services Guarantee Fund’ is a horizontal partial 
equalisation mechanism. The autonomous governments put in a common pool the 75% 
of their potential tax capacity, and the total amount is distributed between all the 
autonomous communities according to their population adjusted by needs. The most 
prosperous autonomous communities, such as Catalonia, have a negative grant to be 
brought to the pool, and the poorest ones, a positive grant coming from this horizontal 
mechanism.  
 
The other two funds, the ‘Global Sufficiency Fund’ and the ‘Competitiveness Fund’, are 
funded by central government. The former was designed as a guarantee so that all 
autonomous communities at least maintained the same level of revenue obtained with 
the previous mechanism. The ‘Competitiveness Fund’ is in fact a sub-fund of a broader 
fund called ‘Cooperation Fund’. This Fund was set up in the 2009 reform, and it is 
allocated to the regions where the difference between ‘fiscal capacity’ (how much they 
contribute to the ‘common pool’) and revenue (how much they receive) is larger. 
 
Autonomous public deficit and debt were relatively controlled until the economic crisis 
started in 2008. In 2007 debt represented an 8.0% of GDP. However, this figure soared 
with the recession to more than 25% in 2012.  
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There have always been statutory limits for the public deficit, borrowing and 
indebtedness levels of Autonomous Communities. The Spanish Parliament establishes 
every year the public deficit targets of different levels of government. In the case of 
autonomous governments, these are decided on the basis of a proposal previously 
agreed by the ‘Fiscal and Financial Policy Council’, a body where financial ministers of 
both central and autonomous governments sit together. The limitations have severely 
hardened in the last years because of both European and Spanish new regulations 
resulting from the fiscal consolidation policies.    
 
The financing system of the Generalitat has been a permanent cause of struggle 
between Catalonia and Spain; this is because it provides only a limited power to decide 
over the taxes that are paid in Catalonia (low quality of fiscal responsibility) and also 
because the amount received is considered unsatisfactory.  
 
This is in turn mainly attributed to the excessive solidarity produced by a system that 
leads to over equalisation. Table 5 shows the effects of implicit and explicit perequation 
mechanisms contained in the financing system of autonomous communities. While 
Catalan citizens make a tax contribution per capita to the funding of total autonomous 
governments that is 20% above the average, the resources per capita available for the 
Catalan government are around the average. Catalonia is ranked third out of fifteen 
Autonomous Communities in terms of tax contribution per capita (i.e., before 
equalisation) and only ninth in terms of autonomous resources per capita (i.e., after 
equalisation). The effects of the equalization can vary from one year to the next, 
according the variation of variables that determine tax contribution (essentially tax 
bases) and of variables that determine revenues (essentially population and other 
expenditure needs). 
 
The new model implementing the new Statute of Autonomy passed in 2009, and  
meant an important change for Catalonia. Before that year, the position of Catalonia in 
terms of revenues per capita was 94 (being 100 the average of all Autonomous 
Communities). Immediately after the reform (2009), it moved to 102.3 (and to 103.6 
considering adjusted population) and then it went down again to 99.4 in 2011 (Table 5).  
 
III. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CATALONIA AND SPAIN (I): 
THE STAYING TOGETHER SCENARIOS 
 
The break-up of the constitutional pact and possible scenarios ahead 
 
The relationship between Catalonia and Spain is currently nearing the end of the cycle 
that started during the transition, period that lapsed from de dictatorship to the 
democracy, and especially with the democratic Constitution of 1978. Many reasons 
have led to a progressive deterioration of the Constitutional agreement. The most 
remarkable one is probably the failure in approving a new ‘Statute of Autonomy’ (the 
by-constitution of Catalonia) in the second half of the 2000’s. Although the ‘Statute of 
Autonomy’ was not abrogated, some of its essential aspects were eliminated or 
interpreted in a very restrictive way. A large majority of Catalans do not consider the 
Constitution as the appropriate framework for self-government since the Constitutional 
Court declared the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia unconstitutional in 2010. 
 
At present the underlying forces that during the transition converged into the 
constitutional pact have strongly reversed their sign. The Constitution was the result of 
a political pact between the democratic opposition, reformists from Franco’s 
establishment and democratic nationalists from Catalonia and the Basque Country. An 
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essential element of this pact (as indicated in the second point of the second section) 
was the acknowledgement of self-government for the usually called ‘peripheral 
nations’. Nowadays, a general perception exists in Spain that the ‘State of Autonomies’ 
has gone too far, and that it has to be corrected by centralising more. On the other 
hand, in Catalonia the opposite perception exists that it is very difficult to find the 
solution for the problems facing Catalan society within Spain. Sovereignism now is in 
the mainstream of Catalan politics. Currently, the main point of the agenda in Catalonia 
is to hold a referendum in which the Catalan people could decide on the link between 
Catalonia and Spain. 
 
So far, the positions about the referendum are deeply opposed: while it is backed by 
nearly eighty per cent of Catalan society, the central government is not planning to 
allow that a referendum is held, on the basis that it is forbidden by the Constitution. At 
this point in time the real struggle is not yet for independence but for the referendum on 
self-determination (which is called ‘the right to decide’). In fact, there are political 
parties which are pro referendum but not pro-independence.  
 
In this context, in theory, four hypothetical scenarios can be envisaged [there is some 
similarity with the scenarios mentioned by Vaillancourt (2010) for the Québec/Canada 
case]. All they imply either a formal or an implicit constitutional change. 
 
Going from more to less centralisation, the first scenario would be the ‘Spanish 
nationalist’ involution. This scenario in turn contains two sub-scenarios, a strong 
involution leading to a centralist revision of the constitutional framework; and a ‘soft’ 
involution, in line with the restrictive interpretation of constitutional precepts already 
made in the last years. The second scenario would be a constitutional reform that 
introduced some kind of generalised and explicit federalism. The third one would be a 
specific and bilateral deal for Catalonia within Spain. The fourth scenario is the 
secession, which also contains two sub-scenarios, depending on whether secession 
leads Catalonia to be within or outside the European Union. 
 
It is not the purpose of this paper to assess the probabilities of each of these scenarios 
or to analyse their political aspects. What matters for the purposes of this paper is that 
all of them are reasonably likely, all of them imply constitutional changes, and that 
these changes would have economic and financial consequences which should be 
studied.  
 
In the next sections, we will limit this analysis to two basic scenarios: the staying 
together scenarios (which include the federalist and the special deal for Catalonia 
ones) and the secession scenario (with its two sub-scenarios). We do not analyse the 
implications of the centralist revision scenario - essentially, because it is not a real 
solution to the conflict. In addition, the scenario would in many respects not be that 
different from the current situation. 
 
Staying together scenarios: Financial implications of constitutional changes 
 
Over the years many proposals, papers and reports have been issued about how to 
improve the economic and financial aspects of both the ‘State of Autonomies’ and the 
specific situation of Catalonia. This section is therefore shorter than the next one, 
where we are obliged to enter the significantly less explored territory of the economic 
aspects of secession. 
  
As we just mentioned, two basic scenarios could be considered in the staying together 
alternative, both implying constitutional changes: a generalised federalist option and a 
singular deal for Catalonia. The agenda of the federalist option is quite well known. 
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Regarding its economic and financial aspects, it could be summed up in four main 
points. 
 
The first one is fiscal responsibility. The essential principle is that spending of 
Autonomous Governments should be largely funded by taxes levied by these 
governments and not by grants coming from central government. In addition, they 
should have both normative and administrative responsibility for these taxes, although 
it is well known that in some taxes (corporate tax, VAT) large limitations exist for having 
full fiscal sovereignty. In the Spanish case, there is significant scope to  improve the 
present situation.  
 
The second point is equalisation. Most federal countries have explicit perequation 
systems. An explicit partial equalisation mechanism was adopted in Spain in 2009. But 
the reform was so cautious and contained so many safeguards that its effects have not 
been satisfactory. As Table 5 shows, the system still produces a strong over 
equalisation. There is therefore still plenty of scope for introducing further substantial 
improvements. 
 
The third point concerns redressing vertical fiscal imbalances (i.e., the ratio potential 
revenues/expenditure needs for central government is much larger than for 
autonomous governments). A new system should involve matching expenditure needs 
with potential tax resources across all Autonomous Communities. As part of that new 
system the current vertical imbalance in favour of the central government should be 
corrected. Furthermore, some regular mechanism should be provided for updating the 
balance between relative tax potential and relative expenditures needs of Autonomous 
Communities and the central government. 
 
Finally, the fourth point is the participation of Autonomous Governments in decision-
making by the state. A large part of tax and economic regulation as well as basic laws 
and economic decisions affecting autonomous responsibilities are undertaken at the 
state level. The actual autonomy of territorial governments is limited by this constraint. 
In some countries, this imbalance is partially corrected with an upper legislative 
chamber (the senate) which represents territorial interests. While different 
implementations are possible (for example, the German and United States formulae 
are quite different), the principle is the same. Some attempts have been made in Spain 
for reforming the Senate in this way, but the results so far have been disappointing.  
 
This scenario of constitutional change could use as a guide the models of federal 
countries with similar political, economic and social characteristics (i.e., Canada, 
Germany, Switzerland and the United States; maybe also Austria and Australia), 
although these certainly are all very different in many aspects. In general terms, these 
are the four points that could constitute the core of an agenda for a federal reform of 
the Constitution. A large consensus exists on the principles, less so on details and on 
their implementation.  
 
The problem is not therefore a lack of a proven model but the will to move toward a 
truly federal system. The Spanish system is a hybrid between a unitary system, with 
more administrative than political decentralisation, and a federal system biased 
towards the central government. Probably the failure of the process of the Statute of 
Autonomy of Catalonia (which was basically inspired by this model) has left this 
scenario deadly wounded. It is very likely that the time for a generalised federal 
solution in Spain is over. 
 
Another possible scenario has to be considered within the staying together alternative. 
This is the scenario of a special deal for Catalonia. One of the most decisive reasons 
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for the current uneasiness in Catalonia is the permanent comparison with the much 
more favourable results obtained by the special financing system of the Basque 
Country (‘Concierto’). The Basque government has full responsibility for the collection 
of all taxes (including VAT and corporate tax). An amount is returned to the state 
(‘cupo’) to compensate central government for the provision of general services in the 
region. It has to be remarked that the last proposal coming from Catalonia to reform the 
financing system (the so-called ‘Fiscal Pact’) was clearly inspired by the system used 
for the Basque Country), and was presented to the central government in September 
2012 with a very large support of political forces and civil society. 
 
Nowadays, the situation is not the same. In Catalonia, the tempos have accelerated, 
secessionism has soared and it will probably be difficult to obtain again general public 
support for the proposal that was rejected by the central government in 2012. The main 
point of the agenda at present is none other than holding a referendum to decide on 
the link between Catalonia and Spain.  
 
It should not however be fully excluded that new options could appear in the course of 
the struggle to celebrate a referendum. One of them could be a special deal for 
Catalonia within Spain. The possibility that such a deal could be acceptable will depend 
on two key aspects: its contents and the guarantees of its fulfilment.  
 
At the moment, given the turn of events, it is difficult to conceive that this deal could be 
limited only to financial aspects. The political aspects have become decisive. Although 
it is not the goal of this contribution to analyse the potential content of this deal, there 
are three points that are probably essential. The first one is the acknowledgement of 
the right of self-determination, i.e.  the right to leave. In fact, a referendum could be 
held on this special deal rather than secession, with the deal probably containing the 
right to leave. Secondly, there is the essential point of language. Catalan people, 
whether they speak Catalan or Castilian, don’t perceive the existence of a linguistic 
problem in Catalan society, where bilingualism is the norm. However, the permanent 
hostility of a large part of Spanish media and a flurry of decisions against the status of 
the Catalan language by the Spanish central courts are seen as a real threat. It is 
therefore very probable that an agreement would not be possible if it does not include 
the full transfer of linguistic responsibilities to the government of Catalonia.  
 
Thirdly, there are the economic and financial aspects. These concern three main 
questions: the adoption of an allocation rule for central government expenditure 
(infrastructures, especially) in Catalonia (similar to the one included in the Statute of 
Autonomy and later watered down by the decision of the Constitutional Court); the real 
scope for the Generalitat to have effective decision-making power on crucial points for 
the Catalan economy; and finally the financing system for the Generalitat of Catalonia. 
In this specific field, a federally inspired model, along the lines of the one just 
described, could probably be acceptable as long as it satisfies two basic points: a large 
fiscal autonomy both on normative and administrative matters; and a limited 
equalisation. 
 
In summary, the alternative of staying together contains two scenarios: a reform of the 
Constitution with generalised federalist inspiration or a special deal for Catalonia. Both 
scenarios would imply constitutional reforms.  
 
IV. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CATALONIA AND SPAIN (II): 
THE SECESSION SCENARIO 
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Main issues 
 
Another alternative is secession. The debate about the economic and financial viability 
of an independent Catalonia has to date mainly focused on the trade off between the 
fiscal benefits of eliminating negative fiscal flows with the rest of Spain, and the losses 
from a potential decline of sales to the Spanish market, the main trade partner of the 
Catalan economy. 
 
More research is especially needed in two fields. First of all, the application of some of 
the most relevant theoretical models to the Catalan case would be very useful. For 
instance, according to Spolaore (2010), the two decisive variables (for determining the 
exact point of the ‘trade off’ between costs and benefits of secession) are the degree of 
openness of the economy and the ability of institutions to deal with heterogeneity. The 
second point to be investigated should be which economic policies benefiting Catalan 
economy that are not adopted at the present by central government could be pursuit by 
an independent Catalonia, and which would be their impact in terms of GDP growth.  
 
These are, certainly, key points. The purpose of this paper is, however, more modest. It 
tries to examine the state of the present debate, and the economic arguments that are 
being exposed pro and con the independence of Catalonia. 
 
This is why the impact on Catalan exports to the rest of Spain and the fiscal flows are 
probably the two main issues that need to be carefully examined in the secession 
scenario. However, other crucial points also deserve to be studied: the potential 
economic benefits from having the power to make political decisions; the costs of a 
potential exit from the European Union and the Euro zone; the effects of the 
fragmentation of the Spanish market; and the allocation of a share of the debts and 
assets of the Spanish state.  
 
Catalan exports to the rest of Spain  
 
The Spanish market is still the first customer for Catalan exports, although it has 
increasingly lost importance over time, especially since Spain joined the EU. One of the 
most crucial questions in the case of secession is its effect on Catalan exports to the 
rest of Spain and its consequences for Catalan GDP.  
 
One of the most frequently mentioned ‘pros and cons’ in this debate is, undoubtedly the 
‘border effect’. It has been studied by many authors (MacCallum, 1995; Anderson and 
Van Wincoop, 2001; Eaton and Kortun, 2002; Ghemawat, 2011a and b). The border 
effect predicts that the mere existence of a border significantly reduces trade between 
two territories due to historical links, similar regulations, language, and more similar 
tastes. The empirical calculations confirm this theory, but provide significantly different 
views as to the strength of the effect. 
  
Rodríguez Mora (2012) provides an empirical approach to assess the border effect in 
the case of separation of Catalonia from Spain. It is based on the assumption that the 
border effect would reduce the intensity of trade between Catalonia and Spain to the 
same levels that it has between Portugal and Spain (80% lower). According to these 
results, the secession of Catalonia would produce a reduction of 3.3% of the joint GDP 
of Catalonia and Spain, consisting of a 9% decrease in Catalan GDP and a 2% 
decrease in the Spanish one.  
 
Paluzie (2010), Guinjoan and Cuadras (2011 and 2012), Cuadras (2012), Antràs 
(2012), Antràs and Ventura (2012), Amat (2013), strongly disagree with these 
estimates, which they consider to be overstatements. According to them, the effect on 
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the GDP of Catalonia of the potential loss of a part of the Spanish market would be 
much lower than this 9%. This is based on several arguments. 
 
First of all, the border effect is a long term effect. It is the fruit of many years of history, 
and it is not an acceptable assumption to presume that the trade flows between 
Catalonia and Spain would suddenly structurally decrease to the levels of the ones 
between Portugal and Spain.  
 
Secondly, according to the latest available data (2011), the destination of goods (not 
including services) produced in Catalonia is as follows: The Catalan market absorbs 
26.7% of total sales, the Spanish market 34.5% and the rest of the world 38.8%. 
However, even if the Spanish market is, by far, the first country destination for Catalan 
exports, its share has been sharply decreasing over time, as the Catalan economy has 
opened to international markets, mainly to the EU. While Spain accounted for 47.1% of 
Catalan exports (i.e., excluding the sales to the Catalan domestic market) in 2011 (and 
the rest of the world for 52.9%), it accounted for 63.5% in 1995 (and the rest of the 
world for 36.5%). Thus, in sixteen years, the share of the Spanish market in Catalan 
exports has declined by 16.4 points. Spain has strongly lost importance for the Catalan 
economy compared to the rest of the world, both because the Spanish market has 
decreased as a destination for Catalan exports and because, even if the sign of the 
commercial flows is still positive for Catalonia, the percentage has sharply decreased 
over the years. An existing long term trend has been reinforced by the crisis of the last 
few years.   
 
A third argument is that the impact of the reduction of exports on GDP is not direct. 
Exports are measured as sales to the rest of the world, while GDP is calculated in 
terms of added value. The conversion of a hypothetical reduction of exports to GDP is 
not automatic. It depends on how far the exports have been produced in Catalonia, or if 
they incorporate a significant fraction of imported intermediate goods. The estimation 
is, thus, relatively complex and requires using Input-Output tables. Guinjoan and 
Cuadras (2011) have shown that a fall of exports from Catalonia to Spain (measured 
as a percentage of GDP) has a transmission effect of two third in terms of GDP.  
 
Considering all these points, these authors have estimated the impact of the reduction 
of exports to the Spanish market on the GDP of Catalonia. According to an extreme 
scenario (a reduction of 50% of consumption goods exports and of 20% of sales to 
firms), the impact in terms of a reduction of the GDP of Catalonia would be in a range 
between 1.7%/2.2%. They remark that this would be a very negative but not very 
probable scenario.  
 
They point out, for example, that during the boycott campaign against Catalan products 
in 2005, during the discussion of the new Statute of Autonomy, the reduction of sales of 
Catalan products was around 5%, so the hypothesis of 50% is an extreme one. In more 
moderate scenarios, these authors conclude that the fall of Catalan GDP could be in a 
range between 1.2%/1.6%, and in more favourable scenarios, even below 1%. 
 
Fiscal flows with the rest of Spain 
 
Fiscal flows between Catalonia and the rest of Spain have been the subject of 
controversy for a long time. There is a long tradition of calculations and estimations of 
the difference between the central tax burden and central government spending 
allocated to Catalonia, i.e. Catalonia’s fiscal deficit (see, among many others, Trias 
Fargas,1960; Petit Fontseré, 1965; Ros Hombravella and Montserrat, 1967; Castells, 
1979 and 1998; Castells and Parellada, 1983a and b; Baró and Bosch, 1996; Castells, 
Barberán, Bosch, Espasa, Rodrigo and Ruiz-Huerta, 2000).  
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Although these are methodologically complex estimations reliable estimates are 
currently available. Both the Spanish and the Generalitat of Catalonia governments 
have produced calculations in the last few years. They use two different approaches to 
calculate the allocation of central government expenditure: the cash-flow approach, 
which allocates the central government expenditure to the territories where the 
spending is made; and the benefit approach, which allocates the expenditure to 
territories according to who receives the services. According to the first approach, 
central institutions and general services placed in Madrid, some of them linked to the 
provision of pure public goods are allocated to only this territory, while according to the 
benefit approach, the expenditure is distributed over all the territories according to 
some indicator (normally, population).   
 
The Departament d’Economia i Finances (Generalitat de Catalunya) (2008) and 
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (2008) estimates for the year 2005 (the only 
comparable ones) are reasonably similar. According to the cash-flow approach, the 
fiscal deficit of Catalonia (negative fiscal flows with the rest of Spain) was equivalent to 
9.8% of GDP (Generalitat of Catalonia estimation) and to 8.7% of GDP (Spanish 
government estimation). According to the benefit approach, the fiscal deficit was 7.4% 
of GDP (Generalitat of Catalonia estimation) and 6.5% of GDP (Spanish government 
estimation). Even if it could appear confusing, the term ‘fiscal deficit’ is commonly used 
in the fiscal federalism literature when the taxes paid by the citizens of a territory to the 
central government are higher than the central government expenditure in this territory. 
The explanation is that the money that leaves the territory is more than the money that 
comes in.  
 
The Spanish government has not published further estimates. The Generalitat of 
Catalonia has regularly published theirs. The last one dates from 2013 and covers the 
period 2005-2010 (Table 6). The Table provides six different calculations. First of all, 
for each approach (cash-flow or benefit), there are two possibilities, depending on 
whether the central budget is ‘neutralised’ by the cycle or not i.e. depending on whether 
the allocation of revenues and expenditures is made ‘as if’ the central government 
budget was balanced. The reason to do this is to correct for the effect of the central 
budget deficit (or surplus). The deficit could distort results, since in years of central 
budget deficit it would hypothetically be possible that the net fiscal flows were positive 
for all Autonomous Communities. The ‘neutralisation’ alternative allows for two further 
possibilities, depending on whether the ‘neutralisation’ is made using total expenditures 
or total revenues. 
 
There are therefore six different estimates, shown in Table 6. According to them, in the 
year 2010 the fiscal deficit of Catalonia amounted to 3.0% of GDP (cash-flow 
approach) and to 0.4% (benefit approach), without ‘neutralising’ the central government 
deficit. However, in this year this one was very large, so the results change a lot when 
it is ‘neutralised’: the fiscal deficit becomes 8.5% (cash-flow approach) and 5.8% 
(benefit approach) using total expenditure and 7.0% (cash-flow approach) and 4.8% 
(benefit approach) using total revenue. 
 
These are the results. The estimates are relatively robust, and the methodology and 
even the results are not generally contested. Problems arise, however, with the 
interpretation of these figures, and in particular when it comes to choose the “most 
valid” approach. Which approach is better, the cash-flow approach or the benefit 
approach? Should the central budget be ‘neutralised’ or is it better not to do it? And in 
case of neutralisation, which should be the total amount used for the procedure: 
expenditure or revenues of the central government?   
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The answer to all these questions should certainly depend on the issue we are 
analysing. As we are speaking of the potential fiscal benefits of the secession of 
Catalonia, which is a sensitive point, it is sometimes very difficult to avoid the 
interference of emotional positions. So, for those who are absolutely against the 
independence of Catalonia, the fiscal deficit of Catalonia is, without discussion, only 
0.4% of GDP (benefit approach, without ‘neutralising’), while for those who are clearly 
for secession the only valid figure is 8.5% (cash-flow approach, ‘neutralising’ for total 
expenditure) (see, among others, De la Fuente, 2012; De la Fuente and Rodríguez 
Mora, 2012; Sala-i-Martin, 2012b; Zabalza, 2012 and 2013; López-Casanovas, 2013). 
Unfortunately, in this area it is not generally the case that the figures or their scientific 
interpretation determines the political positions, but rather the opposite. There are pre-
determined political positions which lead to choosing the figure which is more 
convenient to support the pre established position.  
 
The academic community should try to introduce some rationality when analysing 
these figures, even if it is difficult in this very politically biased context. It could therefore 
be useful to consider some points.  
 
First of all, when considering the ‘neutralisation’ issue (should the allocation of 
expenditures and revenues be made ‘as if’ the central government budget was 
balanced?), it is necessary to distinguish between the short term and the long term 
effects. Assuming that the central budget is balanced along the cycle, the structural (or 
permanent) effect of eliminating the fiscal flows with the rest of Spain (long term effect) 
is better caught by the ‘neutralised’ figures. For the short term effects, the non- 
neutralised figures are more suitable, since the immediate impact on the GDP and on 
the Catalan public finances would be according to the currently observed fiscal flows.  
 
It is therefore true that an independent Catalonia could have more solid and 
sustainable finances over time. But it is very misleading to claim that in this 
independent Catalonia all the financial problems of the Generalitat would disappear 
overnight.  
 
Secondly, the cash-flow and the benefit approaches explain different issues and give 
answer to different questions. The benefit approach is more suitable if the objective is 
to estimate the impact on the reduction of the public deficit (of the government of 
Catalonia). The reason is that if Catalonia became an independent country, a part of 
the central expenditure not currently allocated in Catalonia should be assumed by the 
government of Catalonia. On the other hand, the cash-flow approach is the appropriate 
one if the objective is to study the impact on the total GDP of Catalonia. This is 
because, even if the government of Catalonia assumed new expenses, the money 
would not flow abroad as is currently happening, but would remain in Catalonia (Sala-i-
Martin, 2012b). 
 
A third question is around how to implement the ‘neutralisation’, either via expenditure 
or via revenues. The neutralisation intends to determine the total amount of a balanced 
structural budget once the cyclical effects both on the expenditure and on the revenue 
side are removed. In normal times it could be assumed that revenues are more 
sensitive to the cycle while expenditures have a more persistent path. Thus, we could 
assume that variations in revenues are mostly responsible for public deficits and 
surpluses, and that, finally, along the cycle, revenues tend to adjust to expenditure. In 
this case, the total amount of expenditure would be the right figure for the 
‘neutralisation’ procedure.  
 
But these are not normal times, because the Spanish public sector is in a process of 
fiscal consolidation, with the aim of reducing structural expenditure. In this case, the 
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total amount of expenditure is probably not the best figure to use, and a more accurate 
estimate (perhaps an intermediate point between total expenditure and total revenue) 
should be used.  
 
In summary, in the long term, we can expect a positive impact in terms of public 
finances of between 4.8% and 5.8% of GDP and a positive impact on GDP between 
7.0% and 8.5% (note that in both cases this is a one-off impact). The impact is lower in 
the short term: around 0.4% in terms of public finances (this would be the effective 
immediate reduction of the Generalitat of Catalonia public deficit) and around 3.0% in 
terms of the one-off impact on GDP. 
 
Some further strategic issues  
 
1) Economic performance and political decision-making power 
 
One of the most permanent criticisms of Catalan society regarding central power is that 
the economic model conceived by the Spanish state has traditionally been a centralist, 
radial, Madrid-based model. This has been a harmful model for Catalan economic 
interests.  
 
When assessing the pros and cons of secession it is important to consider the potential 
positive effect from gaining more political decision-making power for taking the 
economic decisions that the Catalan economy needs. This point has been stressed by 
many authors, in particular regarding infrastructure policy, but also the design of 
institutions, and the implementation of public policies and regulatory frameworks 
(Paluzie, 2010; Cuadras, 2012; Sala-i-Martin 2012b: Galí, 2012; Antràs and Ventura, 
2012; Tugores, 2013). 
  
It would therefore be important to understand better how far this factor could increase 
the trend growth rate of Catalan GDP. That is, how far it could increase the slope of the 
GDP line over time. Unlike the elimination of the negative fiscal flow, which has a one-
off effect, this one is a permanent effect For instance, if the ‘normal’ rate of growth of 
GDP was 2%, and the ‘capacity of decision power’ moved this rate to 2.5%, the effect 
on the Catalan GDP would be equivalent to the elimination of a fiscal deficit of 8.0% of 
GDP in the year zero after 15.7 years.  
 
The economic model implicitly or explicitly fostered by the central government is a 
radial, Madrid-based model. In some strategic aspects, for example, airports, rail 
transportation, and regulation policy, it is therefore not difficult to speculate with the 
positive effects for the Catalan economy of having a direct decision-making power. 
Further research is needed, however, to obtain estimates of he effects of these policies 
on the potential growth rate of the GDP. 
 
2) The EU and Euro zone membership  
 
One decisive point is what would happen in relation to the membership of Catalonia in 
the European Union and the Euro zone. Probably, whether an independent Catalonia 
was a formal member of the EU or not, everybody would be interested in keeping the 
conditions of the single market in Catalonia. The presence of European firms in 
Catalonia is very high, trade links are strong, and the Catalan corridor accounts for a 
high percentage of the transport of goods between Spain and the rest of Europe. It 
would therefore not be probable that trade barriers would rise again between Catalonia 
and the countries of the EU. 
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However, unlike Scotland, Catalonia is not only a member of the EU, but also of the 
Euro zone. This is, of course, an open question. The ‘status’ of an independent 
Catalonia regarding the EU would depend essentially on political factors. However, the 
costs of leaving the euro would be very high. Catalan banks would have serious 
difficulties to access the European Central Bank liquidity mechanisms [see Galí (2013) 
and Jobst e.a. (2012) about this point]. These mechanisms have been essential in the 
last years; the Catalan government would face serious difficulties in financing its debt 
through the markets and, without the access to the mechanisms that the Euro zone 
provides, it would probably be condemned to default; and if the Catalan currency had 
to devaluate in relation to the Euro, it would be very difficult to repay the burden of 
foreign debt. 
 
A scenario of Catalonia outside the Euro is not a sustainable scenario. This is an 
important point. For many people, the vote in a referendum could crucially depend on 
whether Catalonia would be excluded from the European Union and the Euro zone. 
 
3) The effects on market efficiency 
 
The secession of Catalonia would produce two kinds of effects in terms of market 
efficiency. On the one hand, it could produce market fragmentation. The Catalan and 
Spanish markets are currently highly integrated. Thus, it is very possible that, as Bell 
(2010) points out for the case of Scotland and the United Kingdom, some kind of 
border effect would appear in these currently highly integrated markets, reducing 
market efficiency. In some areas such as the financial market, market fragmentation 
could lead to a critical situation. This is probably one of the biggest issues to be 
discussed in a hypothetical referendum over the independence of Catalonia. Could an 
independent Catalonia preserve its present financial power? Again, in a very large part, 
the answer depends on whether Catalonia continues to be part of the EU and the Euro 
zone.    
 
On the other hand, new regulations could be more pro market efficiency than the 
current ones in the Spanish state. In some markets like labour or services markets, 
rigidities are still important, and there is substantial room for improving efficiency (Galí , 
2012; Antràs and Ventura, 2012). 
 
4) The allocation of liabilities and assets 
 
A final relevant point is the allocation of common assets and liabilities. This is a topic 
generally examined in these processes (Bell 2010; Vaillancourt, 2010), and some 
authors have studied it for the Catalonia/Spain case (see, among others, Bosch and 
Espasa, 2012; Sala-i-Martin, 2012a; Tugores, 2013). First of all, it is necessary to 
specify the scope of liabilities and assets to be considered. State debt is an obvious 
case. Secondly, different indicators are possible for the allocation. An elementary 
approach is to allocate it according to population shares. However, other approaches 
are possible. For instance, Bosch and Espasa (2012) use the share of central 
government expenditure in some recent period of years. But other arguments, along 
opposite lines, could obviously be provided.  
 
A special case that is often mentioned is the Social Security Reserve Fund. The 
portfolio of the Fund largely consists of state debt, so the temptation could exist to 
propose to consolidate it before allocating state debt. The result would be clearly 
different if other alternatives, like allocating it according to social contributions, were 
adopted. 
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Finally, there is the allocation of state assets. The Spanish state has the ownership of 
physical and financial assets. How should these assets be allocated if Catalonia 
seceded? Which are the assets to be considered? There is no clear answer to this 
important point, and not many previous experiences elsewhere to draw from. But it 
seems clear that if a share of total state debt should be assumed by the new sovereign 
state, the same should happen with total state assets. 
 
The allocation of liabilities and assets is always a political issue. The principle is clear: 
the new state should assume a share of assets and liabilities from the former common 
state. But there are not general recipes, and the decisive aspect is, ultimately, whether 
the separation is the result of a friendly or an unfriendly process.  
 
V. A CONCLUDING REMARK: A FRIENDLY OR AN UNFRIENDLY PROCESS 
 
A crucial point to assess the economic and financial effects of the scenario of 
secession is the path that could lead to it. A process of secession is never a 
gentleman’s contest. Central governments usually refuse for a long time to accept that 
the fragmentation of the territory could even be considered. Territories that intend to 
hold a referendum on self-determination usually need a long time for the process, and 
have to jump many hurdles on the way.  
 
But it is clear that these effects are very different if the secession is the result of an 
agreement between parts and their conditions are negotiated between them in a 
friendly way (as it happens in the case of Scotland/United Kingdom and happened 
before in the case of Quebec/Canada), instead of a traumatic secession. Traumatic 
here does not necessarily mean violent, but without dialogue, with very polarised 
positions, with a locked negative to sit around a table by one side and the threat of 
unilateral pronunciations by the other side.  
 
This is currently the situation in the conflict Catalonia/Spain, where no form of 
institutional dialogue even exists, and the positions of both sides are far apart. The 
current subject of conflict still is not secession, but a referendum, and for the moment 
the doors are absolutely closed not only to accepting to hold it but even to beginning to 
speak about the proposal. 
 
Even if it is evident that neither in Quebec nor in Scotland the process towards the 
referendum was short, easy and free of tensions, this is an aspect which is particularly 
unique to the current situation in Catalonia. And this difference has a strong impact on 
the economic and financial elements in all the fields we have assessed. It is clear that 
political conflict could have economic consequences, both for the trade between 
Catalonia and Spain, for the financial markets and for the EU and euro zone 
membership issue.  
 
Economic decisions are always strongly determined by expectations about social and 
political stability, confidence in the institutions and in the rule of law, and perceived 
security for creditors about the payment of debts and fulfilment of contracts. And in the 
scenario of secession, all these elements would crucially be affected by the way it is 
achieved.  
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Table 1
Economic Indicators (2012)
Catalonia Spain % Cat/Spain
Population (January 2013) 7.547.000 47.060.000 16,0
GDP
   Total amount (million €) 198.633 1.051.204 18,9
   Annual growth (%) (in real terms) -1,0 -1,4
   Per capita (EU27=100) (PPP) 116,9 97,7 119,7
   Per capita (EU15=100) (PPP) 106,7 89,0
Sectorial Structure of GDP (%)
   Agriculture 1,3 2,5
   Industry 19,2 15,5
   Construction 7,1 8,3
   Services 64,2 65,4
   Taxes 8,3 8,3
   Total 100,0 100,0
Good Exports
   Total amount (million €) 58.322 222.644 26,2
   Variation (%) 5,7 4,0
Employment
   Total employees (thousands) 2.889 17.282 16,7
   Variation (%) -6,2 -4,5
Unemployment
   Total unemployment (thousands) 846 5.769 14,7
   Unemployment Rate 22,6 25,0
      Last figures
      IV trim. 2013 22,3 26,0
      III  trim. 2013 22,8 26,0
Tourism
   Visitors (thousands) 15.534 57.701 26,9
   Variation (%) 3,8 2,7
   Total expenditure (million €) 12.608 55.594 22,7
   Variation (%) 13,8 5,7
Source: Own elaboration from data IDESCAT and INE.  
 
 
 
Table 2
Distribution of total public expenditure for levels of government in Spain (1978-2010) (% of total)
1978 1984 1990 2000 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(P)
Central Government 89,0       72,6       59,6       59,0       54,7       50,7 50,0 50,0 50,4 52,0
     Central Administration 39,1      31,9      26,2      25,7      24,4      22,2 21,7 21,4 20,7 20,4
     Social Security Administration 49,9      40,7      33,4      33,3      30,3      28,5 28,3 28,6 29,7 31,6
Autonomous Governments -         14,4       23,9       28,3       32,3       35,9 35,9 36,4 35,7 34,6
Local Governments 11,0       13,0       16,5       12,7       13,0       13,4 14,1 13,6 13,8 13,4
Total public sector expenditure 100,0     100,0     100,0     100,0     100,0     100,0 100,0 100,0 99,9 100,0
Source: Own elaboration from data of the Intervención General de la Adminsitración del Estado.
(P) Provisional.  
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Table 3
Expenditure of Generalitat of Catalonia by functions (% of total)
% of total % of total % of total % of total 
 General expenditure 7,2 6,9 5,0 4,3
Justice, public safety and civil protection 5,7 5,5 6,3 5,3
 Health 27,2 26,2 28,0 23,8
 Education 17,2 16,6 17,3 14,8
 Infrastructures and mobility 8,6 8,3 7,5 6,4
 Protection and social promotion 6,1 5,9 8,6 7,3
 Promotion and regulation of the productive sectors (2) 5,3 5,2 8,2 7,0
 Financial support to local entities 9,5 9,1 9,2 7,8
Others (1) (2) 13,2 12,7 9,9 8,5
Public debt interest 2,0 5,4
Public debt repayment 1,7 9,4
Total without debt interest and debt repayment 100,0 100,0
Total amount without debt interest and debt repayment (million €) 33.493,8 31.538,7
Total  with debt interest and debt repayment 100,0 100,0
Total amount with debt interest and debt repayment (million €) 34.750,0 37.032,5
Source: Own elaboration from data Generalitat de Catalunya
 (1)  Includes environment, information and knowledge society and telecomunications, housing, research, culture and sports. 
 (2) Between 2008 and 2012 some expenditures included in the category 'Others' were moved to the category 'Promotion and regulation of the productive sectors'.
2008 2012
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Table 4
Revenues of Generalitat of Catalonia
1
 (2012)
Million € %
1. Tax revenues 17.942,4 73,7
1.1. Own Taxes 379,2 1,6
1.2.Fully Ceded Taxes 2.728,4 11,2
     Inheritance Tax 197,6 0,8
     Wealth Tax 240,4 1,0
     Real Estate Transactions Tax 1.221,1 5,0
     Gamble Tax 254,0 1,0
     Vehicles Sales Tax 114,2 0,5
     Retail Hydrocarbons Tax
2
390,0 1,6
     Energy Tax 311,1 1,3
1.3.Shared Taxes 14.834,8 61,0
     Personal Income Tax 7.664,1 31,5
     Value Added Tax 5.219,3 21,4
     Tobaco Excise 857,7 3,5
     Alcohool Excise 123,2 0,5
     Hydrocarbons Excise 983,0 4,0
     Excise adjustment -12,5 -0,1
2. Grants 1.935,1 8,0
2.1. From Central Government
3
1.789,9 7,4
     Global Sufficiency Fund 1.765,1 7,3
     Fundamental Public Services Guarantee Fund -1.065,5 -4,4
     Adjustment for previous years 1.090,3 4,5
2.2. Other Grants 145,2 0,6
3. Other revenues
4
4.455,5 18,3
Total non-financial revenues 24.333,0 100,0
Source: Own elaboration from data Generalitat de Catalunya.
1 Budgetary previsions.
2 Surcharge over the central government excise.
3 Not includes Competitiveness Fund.
 4 Includes income from assets, pass through grants from central government to local governments,
   capital grants from central government and other minor reveunes.  
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Table 5
Equalization Effect of Autonomous Financing System
Tax 
Capacity
Total 
Revenues
Tax 
Capacity
Total 
Revenues
Tax 
Capacity
Total 
Revenues Tax Capacity
Total 
Revenues
Catalonia 121,1 94,0 119,2 102,3 119,1 99,4 120,7 103,6
Galicia 84,7 115,0 88,3 107,3 91,2 110,9 83,2 101,1
Andalusia 79,2 102,1 79,8 92,3 79,9 93,9 81,1 93,8
Asturias 100,3 114,9 103,4 108,8 106,6 112,6 99,8 105,0
Cantabria 102,4 117,0 112,7 117,8 114,4 124,4 112,9 118,1
La Rioja 101,4 117,1 102,0 110,8 103,2 120,7 100,7 109,4
Murcia 79,9 90,5 84,4 94,3 83,5 93,1 86,2 96,3
Valencia 96,4 88,9 92,8 92,8 93,7 93,6 94,5 94,6
Aragón 112,4 115,2 113,3 110,2 114,6 116,3 107,7 104,8
Castile-Mancha 79,9 108,6 85,3 101,6 85,4 103,4 80,8 96,2
Canary Islands 42,7 96,6 46,3 87,3 42,2 88,3 44,7 84,3
Extremadura 67,8 126,2 73,8 111,6 76,2 114,5 69,6 105,3
Balearics Islands 126,9 78,7 121,6 99,3 121,7 100,8 121,7 99,4
Madrid 142,8 89,4 137,3 102,2 134,2 95,4 145,9 108,6
Castile and Leon 95,2 119,7 99,0 112,2 101,5 116,3 92,3 104,6
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Own elaboration from data Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas.
(average auton.comm.= 100) 
2009
(average auton.comm.= 100) 
Per population Per adjusted population
20112007 2009
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6
Net fiscal flows of Catalonia with the rest of Spain (% of Catalan GDP)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cash-Flow Approach
Actual Fiscal Flows (without neutralisation) -9,8% -10,3% -10,7% -5,7% -0,4% -3,0%
Neutralised Fiscal Flows
1
   Using total expenditure -8,3% -7,9% -8,1% -8,5% -8,4% -8,5%
   Using total revenue -8,8% -8,6% -8,9% -8,4% -6,3% -7,0%
Benefit Approach
Actual Fiscal Flows (without neutralisation) -7,4% -8,0% -8,2% -3,2% 2,1% -0,4%
Neutralised Fiscal Flows
1
   Using total expenditure -6,0% -5,6% -5,6% -5,9% -5,8% -5,8%
   Using total revenue -6,3% -6,1% -6,2% -5,3% -4,3% -4,8%
Source: Own elaboration from data Generalitat de Catalunya.
1 'As if' the central government budget was balanced.
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